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AUrOmoBILS-IJABILrY OF OwNER OP INJURY CAUSED aY His UmieaxsmmD C.mL-The defendant purchased an automobile and rented it to one G.

The latter's servant, who was not proved negligent, ran into and injured the
plaintiff. The automobile still bore the license tags of the original owner, the
defendant having failed to re-register it under his own name as provided by
statute. Held: The plaintiff can recover. Pierce v. Hutchinson, 136 N. E.
261 (Mass. 1922).

This case is in accord with the Massachusetts doctrine as laid down in
all the previous cases in that jurisdiction. See i6 A. L. R. irrg; Berry, Automobiles 273 (3d ed. i92:). The theory is that an unregistered machine is a
nuisance and a trespasser upon the highway. The owner, who permits the
car to be used, as the one responsible 'for the nuisance, is held liable for any
injury caused by the automobile, regardless of the driver's negligence. The
owner is also prevented from recovering for any damage caused to his car
or himself while a passenger unless the act was wanton or wilful.
Several states in early cases indicated that they would follow this view
and make failure to comply with the statutory registration requirements, alter
the civil rights and liabilities of an automobile owner. Bortner v. York R. Co.,
22 Pa. Dist. R. 84 (i913); McCarthy v. Leeds, zi5 Me. 134, 93 Atl. 72 (igi6i);
Knight v. Savannah EL Co, 2o Ga. App. 3T4, 93 S. E. 77 (r917). The
'Georgia case has been frequently questioned and criticised by courts of the
same state and has never been followed, whereas the Maine courts have followed the Massachusetts doctrine only in cases involving similar facts. (See
Shepherd's citations for Georgia and Maine.) Hadeed v. Neweiler, 44 C. C. 53
(i9i6), a Pennsylvania case decided three years after Bortner v. York R. Co,
supra, is directly contra to it, and indicates that Pennsylvania will' not follow
Massachusetts.
The great weight of authority is opposed to the decision in the principal
case. The almost universally accepted doctrine is that failure to license properly an automobile is an offense against the state. Since that failure is in
no way a contributing factor to the accident it ought not, therefore, to affect
the civil liability of the operator or owner. Hyde v. McCreery, 145 App. Div.
729, 13o N. Y. S. -269 (1911) ; Black v. Moore, x35 Tenn. 73, 185 S. W. 682
(1916); Munne v. Sutherland, x98 S. W. 395 (Tex. 191,). See 63 U. OF PA.
L, Rav. 60 (1914).
*The following Recent Cases are discussed in the Notes, supra: The
Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad v. Settle avd Clephane, 43 Sup.
Ct. 28 (19z2); R. & W. Hat Shop, Inc., v. Sculley, iig At. 55 (Conn. 1922);
Dawson, Limited, v. Bonnin,, 38 Times L R. 836 (Eng. xy22); In re Marcuse
& Co., 281 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. epz); Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234
N. Y. r5 (Ct of App. i9na); and St. Casimir's Polish R. C. Church Case,
273 Pa. 494 (i9-2). Numerous Recent Cases involving negligence at gradecrossings and problems under the Eighteenth Amendment are treated
in Notes on thuse subjects.
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BILLS AND NOTs-NEGOTIABILITY-RETENTION OF TITLE UNTIL PAYMENT.-

The plaintiff sued as indorsee for value in good faith before maturity of
certain notes made by the defendant. He had knowledge that they were
given to the payee as part of the purchase price of a tractnr, and that the contract of sale of the tractor provided that the title to the machine should remain
in the vendor until the whole consideration was paid by the vendee. The
defendant argued that, in view of the plaintiff's knowledge, the provision for
retention of title in the vendor until payment rendered the promise conditional and the note non-negotiable. Held, a negotiable note under N. I. L,
See. 3 (2). Peoplc's Bank v. Porter,2o8 Pac. 2w (CaL sp"s).
Before the adoption of the N. I. L, the weight of authority was that the
mere retention of the title of a chattel, for whose purchase price the note was
given, until the payment:of the note, did not render conditional an otherwise
unqualified promise to pay, and, hence, did not make the note non-negotiable.
8 C. J. is,,and cases cited, note 52; 3 R. C. L 917; Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (6th ed. ixx3), Sec. 52; Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Bank, .36 U. S. 269, 34 L. ed. 349, io Sup. Ct. 999 (i889)-the leading case on the subject; National Bank of Royersford v. Davis, 6 Montgomery
Co. L R. pp (Pa. i89oy; Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28, 74 N. NV. 289
(189&). But the minority view was that such a note was not negotiable, some
courts basing their decisions on the ground that a provision for the retention
of title as security until payment of the note, rendered conditional an otherwise unqualified promise: Third National Bank of Syracuse v. Armstrong, 25
Minn. 530 (1879); Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan. 3i0 (iS88; while another court
held such a note non-negotiable on the ground that the promise to pay was
itself qualified. Sloan v. McCarty, .34Mass. 245 (883).
In Pennsylvania the
only direct adjudication of the question appears to be that in the case of
National Bank of Royersford v. Davis, .supra. Two other cases generally
cited as contra to the principal case might be distinguished as cases of conditional sales, and not of mere retention of title as security: Post v. Railway
Co., 771 Pa. 1515, 33 AtM 362 (1895); Gazlay v. Riegel, x6 Pa.. Super. Soz
(spot). See also, Devenny v. Building Association, 9 W. W. C. x27 (Pa.
i88o). For a discussion of the validity of this distinction, see Chicago Railway
Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Bank, supra; its validity has been questioned in
3 VA. LAw REG. 898 (898).
By Section 3 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, "An unqualified
order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act,
though coupled with . . . (2) a statement of the transaction which gives
rise to the instrument." The wisdom of this wording has elicited considerable
discussion. Judge Brcwster has stated that this section was intended to
cover the case of such a "chattel note" as exists in the principal case and to
unify the law in conformity with the weight nf authority. But Dean*Ames
feared that the section was not clearly enough applicable to the case of a
"chattel note" to change the law of the minority jurisdictions, and Mr. McKeehan seemed to be of the same opinion. Their views are set forth in
Brannan, N. I. L (3d ed. 19i), at pp. 437, 421 and 47.
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Since the adoption of the uniform law in the several states, there have
been five cases in accord with the principal case: Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber
Co, 145 N. C. 12o, 58 S. E. 9o9 (19o7) (but no reference was made in the
decision to the N. I. L); Schmidt v. Pegg, i7z Mich. r59, 137 NL W. 524
(912) ; Ex porte Bledsoe, i8o Ala. 586, 61 So. 813 (19r3) ; Citizens' National
Bank v. Buckheit, 14 Ala. App. Sr,71 Sb,& (916); Welch v. Owenby, 175
Pac. 746 (Okla. 1918). There have been no cases directly contra to the principal case, since the adoption of the Act; and three cases which have been
cited as contra might be distinguished, the first two on the ground that a conditional sale was involved: Worden Grocer Co. v. Blanding, 161 Mich. 254,
m26 N. WV. 2rz (igio); Fleming v. Sherwood, 24 N. D. z44, 139 N. W.
i0r (1912) ; and the third on the ground that possession of the property was
to be resumed on default of payment, as well as title retained until payment:
Polk County State Bank of Crookston v. Walters, 145 Minn. 149, 176 N. W.
496 (i92o). The latter two cases, however, contain dicta contra to the principal case.
The principal case, settling a point de novo in its jurisdiction, adds another
decision to the line of cases since the adoption of the act, which have followed
Judge Brewster's interpretation of the meaning of Section 3 (2). But the
apprehensions of Dean Ames and Mr. McKeehan, -while not yet justified, will
not be either entirely dispelled or finaily confirmed until the former minority
jurisdictions pass directly upon the question raised in the principal case, under
the Act.
CARRIE S-FIXING VALLE or GOODS SH5PPED---AiTRARY

VALUATION.-

Although neither party knew the contents or value of the package, an agent
of the plaintiff shipper at the request of the defendant carrier's agent agreed
upon a value and placed the same in an express receipt. The goods were lost
it; transitu and the plaintiff sued to recover their full value. Judgment having
been given for the plaintiff the carrier appealed on the ground that the recovery should have been limited to the lesser amount named in the express receipt.
dissenting.) Judgment affirmed. American
Held: (Hines, I., and Beck, P. L.,
Ry. Express Co. v. Bailey, 113 S.F. 551" (Ga. 1922).
For the purpose of determining the freight charges and the carrier's
responsibility for damages should the -goods be lost, the law allows a contract to be made fixing the value of the property shipped. Brehme v. Dinsmore, 25 Md. 328 (x866); Hill v. Boston, H. & W. Ry.Co, r44 Mass. 2k4, i
N. . 836 (1837); Zimmer v. N. Y. C. & L R. Ry. Co, 137 N. Y. 46o, 33
N. E. 542 (1893). When such an agreement is entered into with the view of
plaping an actual (some courts term this "bona fide") value on the goods, the
carrier will not be liable for a greater sum than that specified, although his
own misconduct causes the loss. Hart v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co, ima U. S. 3r,
28 L ed. 717, 5 Sup. Ct 75r (x84); Alair v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co, 53
Minn. i6o, 54 N. V. 1072 (1893) ; Ullman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.Co,
11:2 Wis. 15o, 88 N. W. 41 (7or). But -where the sum specified is merely an
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arbitrary pre-adjustment of damages, the courts have refused to be bound
by the contract, and have reverted to the common law rule, under which the
shipper is allowed to recover the full value of the goods lost or destroyed.
Moulton v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co, 31 Minn. 85, 16 N. W.
497 (1883); McFadden v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co, 92 Mo. 343, 48 S. W.
689 (1887); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 113 Ga. 5r4, 38 S. E.
970 ('go').
The courts have disagreed in attempting to determine whether a value
stated in an express receipt is an actual or an arbitrary value. A stipulation
which limits recovery in the case of loss to the maximum specified in the
contract has been held to be an arbitrary valuation and is said to be unenforceable as an attempt to limit the carrier's liability for negligence. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 3s0, 14 S. NV. 311 (1890); Ells v. St.
Louis, K. & N. V. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. 903 (1893). But the majority of courts,
among them the Supreme Court of the United States, have repudiated this
view and have recognized as valid such maximum value stipulations. Kansas
City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. ed. 683, 33 S. Ct. 39r,
(I9i) ; Alair v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co, supra; Ullman v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co supra.
When the value inserted in the contract is one designated by the shipper
at the request of the carrier, this has been regarded as an actual valuation,
and as therefore limiting the liability of the carrier. Harvey v. Terre Haute,
Yet other courts have held that when the
etc., Ry. Co, 74 Mo. 538 (881).
value was inserted in the contract without being named by the shipper, the
liability was not limited. Southern Express Co. v. Hanaw, 134 Ga. 445, 67 S.
E. 944 (igpo);'Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Murphey, .supra. The weight of
authority seems to be that if the value inserted by the carrier is acquiesced in
by the shipper, there is as much an "agreed valuation" as when the shipper
himself suggests the value. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harriman
227 U. S. 657, 33 S. Ct. 397, 57 L. ed. 69o (1913) ; Hart v. Pa. Ry. Co., supra;
Alair v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., supra.
It is submitted that following the line of previous Georgia decisions, the
principal case is correctly decided. Yet the view accepted in many other
jurisdictions would seem to lead to the opposite conclusion, that since the
agent of the shipper acquiesced in the value suggested, the value was actual
and the carrier's liability therefore limited.
CITIzENSHIP-NATURALIZATION-ELIOIBILTY

OF JAPANF.sF---O

an appeal

from an order of the District Court of Hawaii, which denied the petition of
the appellant to be admitted as a citizen of the United States, on the ground
that he had been born in Japan and was of the Japanese race, though otherwise fully qualified, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified questions to the United States Supreme Court, which, briefly stated,
amounted to the inquiry as to whether one who is of the Japanese race and
born in Japan is eligible to citizenship under the Naturalization Laws. Held:-
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The answer is in the negative. Takao Ozawa v. United States, United States
S,,preme Court, No. i, October Term, 1922.
The classes of persons eligible for naturalization are defined by Section
2x169 of the Revised Statutes, amended (or, rather, corrected) by the Act
of February i8, 1875, !Z Stat. at L 316, 318, c. 80, as follows: "The provisions of this tile shall apply to atiens being free white persons, and to aliens
of African nativity and to persons of African descent." It has been uniformly held that the Act of June v9, i9o6, 34 Stat. at L. 596 (Part z) providing "for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens" is limited by
Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes. United States v. Balsara, i8o Fed. 694,
1o3 C. C. A. 660 (Cgio); Bessho v. United States, x78 Fed. 245, 1o C. C.
A. 6o5 (igo) ; it re Alverto, 198 Fed. 688 (D. C. 19i) ; In re Rallos, 241 Fed.
686 (D. C. 1917); In re Charr, 273 Fed. 207 (D. C. 1921). 'Section 2169, specifically reaffirmed by the Act of May 9, 1918, 40 Stat. at L. 5-4z (Part x) c. 69,
is the only remaining provision on the statute books defining those entitled
to naturalization.
Under this section, it has been generally held that the word "white' is
meant to create a racial or ethnological distinction and to Tender eligible
only members of the white or Caucasian race. In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer x55,
Fed. Cas. 1o4 (1878) ; In re Saito, 62 Fed. 126 (x894); In re Yamashito, 30
Wash. 234 (19o2) ; In rc Mohan Sin gh, 257 Fed. 2o9 (D. C. 1919). Contra:
In re Halladjian, 174 Fed. 834 (19o9). See also, In re Young, 198 Fed. 715
(D. C. 1912). Since the weight of scientific authority regards the Japanese
as members of the Mongolian and not of the Caucasian race, or, at least, as
not, in general, members of the white race, it is clear that Japanese are not
included in the eligible classes. In re Saito, supra; In re Yamashito, supra;
In re Kumagai, 163 Fed. 92z (D. C. igo8); Bessho v. United States, supra;
In re Young, supra.
The decision on this question by the Supreme Court, as rendered in the
convincing opinion of Justice Sutherland, settles authoritatively a subject
which has been much mooted in recent years.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION O PULLMAN CAas-UITr Riu .- The
State of Wisconsin imposed a tax upon the cars of the defendant Pullman
Car Company, a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce. It
assessed the property by the unit rule, considering (i) the ratio of the miles
of track over which its cars ran in Wisconsin to the miles of track traversed
by its cars everywhere; and (2) the ratio of the number of miles traveled in
one year by its cars in Wisconsin to the number of miles traveled in ode
year by its cars everywhere. To obtain the assessable value of the property
of .the Company in Wisconsin, each of these ratios was applied to the value
of the entire sleeping car business of the Company as determined by various
methods. From the results thus obtained an average was struck, and the
assessment placed at that sum. Held: Thit method of assessment is constitutional State v. Pullman Co., id9 N. I. r43 (Wis. 1922).
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The personal property owned in any state by a corporation, whether do-

mestic or foreign, engaged in interstate commerce may be taxed by that
State. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1o7 Pa. x56 (x884), affirmed,
141 U. S. 18, 35 L ed. 613, ii Sup. Ct. 876 (i89i); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 141 U. S. 40, 35 L ed. 628, rz Sup. CL 889
(i89i). The unit rule of taxation of companies engaged in interstate commerce, on either of the bases used in the principal case (track-mileage or carmileage), has long been held constitutional where there is a physical union
l-etween the property of the Company within the state and that outside the
state-as in the case of telegraph and railroad companies. Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 53o, 3z L. ed. o, 8 Sup. Ct. 961
(iSS); Railway v. Backus, 154 U. S. 42r, 38 L. ed. 1o31, 14 Sup. Ct. 1114
(1894); Illinois Central Railroad v. Greene, 244 U. S. 5s5, 6z L. ed. 1309, 37
Sup. Ct. 697 (197). This rule has been extended to cases in which there
is no physical union of the property, but where there is a unity of use and
management as in the case of express companies and refrigerator companies.
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, z65 U. S. 194, 4 L ed. 683, 17 Sup. Ct. 305
(i897); American Refrigerator Transportation Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, 43 L.
ed. 899, iz Sup. Ct. 599 (189). The method of valuation of the entire
property of the corporation in order to apply the unit rule, has, in general,
been held a matter within the discretion of the state legislatures, and has
not usually been interfered with in the absence of fraud. Illinois Central
Railroad v. Greene, jupra. The courts have gone so far as to say that a tax
upon the gross earnings within the state, in lieu of the a tax upon property,
or a tax "measured by the net income of the Company," is valid. Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Minnesota, x- Minn. 3o, isi N. NNT.
410 (1915), affirmed, 246
U. S.450, 62 L ed. 827, 38 Sup. Ct. 373 (1918) ; Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 65 L. ed. i65, 41 Sup. Ct. 45 (9o). But,
the unit rule, when arbitrarily applied and resulting in a valuation widely at
variance with the actual physical value of the property of the company within
the state has been recently held unconstitutional as a restriction upon interstate commerce, and as a deprivation of property without due process of
law. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 2/5, 63 L ed. 60, 39 Sup.
Ct. 276 (ig9g); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 64 L ed. 782, 40 Sup. Ct.
435 (i92o). These cases seem to indicate a tendency on the part of the Supreme Court in very recent years to scrutinize more carefully than formerly the application of the unit rule. In the principal case, however, the
assessement was carefully made and all special circumstances taken into account: it seems probable, therefore, that the decision of the Visconsin court
would, if appealed, be upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
COVENAXTS-BUILDNr, RESTRICTIOXS-SAIE

UNDER A

GENERAL PLA.-The

plaintiff and the defendant bought adjoining lots. The former's deed included a covenant that he should build only a one-family house. The latter's
deed wai free from restrictions, hut he had notice of the restrictions affect-
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ing all other nearby grantees. Circulars and maps showing that the sale
of lots was being made under a general plan had previously been distributed
by the common grantor. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
erecting stores. Held: Injunction granted. Kempncr v. Sinon, rig Misc. Rep.
6o, 195 N. Y. S. 333 (19=).
The existence of a general scheme for improvement under which restrictions of a similar nature are imposed on the various grantees, indicates that
the benefit of the restrictions was intended to be annexed to the land. Nottingham Brick & Tile Co. v. Butler, L R. (1886) 16 Q. B. D. 778; Allen v. City
of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. WV.317 (igii); Johnson v. Mt. Baker Presbyterian Church, 113 XN'ash. 458, 194 Pac. 536 (ig2o). And if it is found that
it was the iniention of the vendor and purchasers that the latter should be
bound inter se by the building restrictions, a court of equity will, in favor
of any one of the purchasers, enforce the restrictions against any other of
them. Frink'v. Hughes, 133 Mich. 63, 94 N. W. '6or (i9o3) ; Schickhaus v.
Sanford, 83 N. J. Eq. 454, 9i At. 878 (i9t4) ; Willsea v. Allen, 183 N. Y. S.
68o (I92o). See 68 U. oF PA. L Rm. 75 (i919-192o).
It is not necessary that there should be any covenant with the grantor, in
order that each grantee should have the benefit of the restrictive covenants
of the others. Western v. MacDermott, L. R. ('868) 2 Ch. App. 72; Muzzareili v. IHut.hinzer, 163 Pa. 643, 30 At!. 29 (x894). If a grantee has notice
of the existence of such restrictions, that is sufficient on his violation of them
to allow another grantee to restrain him. Richards v. Revitt, L. R. (r876) 7
Ch. Div. 24; Pearson v. Stafford, 88 N. J. Eq. 385, io2 At!. 836 (i9i8); Wilson Co. v. Gordon, 2z4 S. NV. 703 (Tex. 192o). Furthermore, it is not neces..
sary for the coznplainant to prove any appreciable damage. Henderson v.
Champion, 83 N. J. Eq. 558, gi Atl. 332 (1914) ; Stevenson v. Spivey, iio S. E.
367 (Va. 1922).
The notice to a grantee necessary to enable other grantees to enforce
restrictions against him in equity may be either actual or constructive. Wilson
v. Hart, L R. (1866) r Ch. App. 461. He is charged with nbtice of restrictions which may be contained in any deed in the chain of title under which
he claims. Peck v. Conway, rig 'Mass. 546 (1876); Winslow v. Newcomb,
87 N. J. Eq. 480, ioo AtL. 613 (1917). But it has been decided that he is
not chargeable with notice of a general building plan merely because of the
uniformity of construction of buildings upon adjoining lots. Bradley v. Walker,
138 N. Y. 29r, 33 N. E. 1079 (1893).
As a general rule, restrictions on the use of a grantees property are enforced, but they are not favored. Hence a court of equity will not enforce
restrictions unless they are proved to exist actually and not by mere implication. St. Andrew's Church's Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (187I) ; Hartman v. Wells, 257
But there is a marked tendency that such
.I1. 167, 1o N. E. -500 (9T2).
restrictions should be stringently enforced when the property is conveyed in
accordance with a'general scheme of improvement. Johnson v. Mt. Baker
Presbyterian Church, siqPra.
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CRIMNAL LAv-OFFENSE AGAINST THE GovERNrT--mXTERRrroRtAL-

Ty.-The defendant was indicted under a Federal Statute for conspiracy to
defraud the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, of which the United
States was sole stockholder. The crime-was laid in the first count on the
high seas, in the second count in the port of Rio Janeiro, in the third count
in the city of Rio Janeiro in Brazil. On demurrer, the indictment was held
bad in the lower court for want of jurisdiction. Held: Judgment reversed.
United States v. Bowman, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 69, October Term, i9pa .
In general, criminal jurisdiction lies solely in the courts of that country
or state in which the crime is committed State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331 (x88);
People v. Devine, i85 Mich. So, 151 N. W. 646 (i'is). In the English
courts, ships on the high seas and even in foreign ports are regarded as part
of the nation whose flag they fly and hence subject to its criminal jurisdiction. Regina v Anderson, L R. z C. C. x6o (Eng. x868). By statute, such
jurisdiction in the case of certain crimes has been conferred upon the Federal
Courts in the United States. United States v. Rodgers, x5o U. S. 249, 31 L
ed. 1071, 14 Sup. Ct. iep (r893). A statute in England has been held to extend the criminal jurisdiction of that country to certain offenses committed
by British subjects while ashore on foreign territory. Rex v. Sawyer, 2 Carr.
& K. oi (Eng. 1Ss). By treaty with semi-civilized countries, or countries,
like China, in which the administration of justice is deemed ineffective, the
Unit d States has taken criminal jurisdiction over its nationals in such countries. 25 C. J. 305. But aside from crimes under Federal jurisdiction becausc of such treaties, it has been held that acts unlawful tinder United States
statute. as offenses against individuals are not punishable in Federal courts
when the acts are committed ashore in foreign territory unless the statute
expressly provides for such jurisdiction. American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 53 I. ed. 8A6, 29 Sup. Ct. Si (spoS). The principal
case was distinguished from that last cited in that the offense was against
the government, and not against a private individual. The exceedingly liberal
holding in the principal case seems entirely unprecedented in the United
States courts. But, as the Chief Justice stated, any narrower interpretation
would rob this statute and many others of a similar nature of much of their
effectiveness.
As WITNESS-EVIENcE OF FORMER
AcusE
CRIMINAL PsocEDuRE-THE A
Co,-xicrzo-.-The defendant, who had been indicted for robbery, testified in
his own defense. Evidence of his former conviction upon a similar charge
was admitted for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. Held: Such evidence was properly admitted. Commonwealth v. John Doe, aliasRoss, 79 Pa.
Super. 162 (9=).
At common law, a party to an action was not competent to testify, and
this rule prevented the giving of any testimony by the accused. People v.
Thomas, 9 Mich. 314 (i86r); Deloohery v. State, 27 Ind. 521 (1867). Therefore, when a defendant in a criminal action testifies in his own behalf, he is
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privilege to the accused usually allow his credibility to be impeached by provavailing himself of a statutory privilege. The statutes which give this
ing his bad character, in the same manner as that of any other witness. The
evidence introduced for this purpose must be such as to affect his credibility,
and not merely his general moral character. Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. z24
(1874); State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 33 S. W. 167 (1895). Previous indictments have been held not to impeach the defendant's credibility, since a man is
presumed innocent until proved guilty. For this reason they are not admissible. State v. Young, 93 N. J. L 396, io AtL 215 (i919); People v. Green,
292 Ill. 351, z27 N. E. 50 (1920).
For the purpose of impeaching his credibility, the defendant can usually
be questioned as to previous convictions since these statutes place him in the
position of an ordinary witness. State v. Hillebrand, 28s Mo. 290, 225 S. W.
ioo6 (i92) ; People v. Andrae et aL, 295 Ill. 445, r29 N. E. z78 (592o) ; People v. Mignano, 193 N. Y. S. 782 (z922)4 However, he cannot be questioned
concerning immoral acts which do not impeach his credibility, such as desertion from military service, Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477, x94 Pac. 939
(1921), or concerning army imprisonments in France which are not proved to
have been for offenses which impeach his credibility. People v. Joyce, 233 N.
Y. 6x, 134 N. E. 836 (1922). In Pennsylvania, the Act of March xS, 19it,
P. L 2o, expressly prohibits the questioning of a defendant, appearing as a
witness, concerning former convictibns; except where he has put his reputation in issue. The principal case, however, decides that this statute does not
prohibit the introduction of evidence of a former conviction of the accused,
to impeach his credibility as a witness.
Since the probable purpose of this statute was to prohibit unfair questions
concerning fictitious and urproved previous convictions, the inference that it
did not intend to prohibit conclusive evidence of previous convictions, introduced to impeach the credibility of the accused, seems well taken.
ELFacTio.

LAW-CONTST-TIREGULARITIES

BY

ELEcTIoN

OFF=ICRs.-The

petitioners requested the rejection of the entire poll in a certain precinct because the election officers, in violation of the election law, left the polling
place and finished counting the ballots in a warmer room in the same building. No fraud was alleged or proved. Held: The petition must be quashed.
Fish's Election, 273 Pa. 410 (922).
This case is not in accord with earlier decisions in !he same jurisdiction
which decided that the return would be vitiated by irregularities in the conducting of an election, such as receiving votes at two polls for the same precinct, Cramer's Election Case, :48 Pa. 2;8 (1915), and holding the election at
a place other than that prescribed by law. Melvin's Case, 6 Pa. 333 (1811).
As a general rule, however, courts feel that innocent voters should not ordinarily be deprived of their right to vote through the mistakes or misconduct of the election officials even though the latter may be liable criminally
for their actions in the matter. Jones v. State. 153 Ind. 440, s5N. E. 229
(1,99) ; McCrary, Elections 552 (4th ed. I&.7).

ERRATA.
Page i53, line 12. "representatives" should be representations.
The second paragraph, page 164. "In an early Massachusetts case," a church member was dropped from the roll
because of his non-attendance. This was done according
to a by-law of the organization. The civil court took jurisdiction and decreed that the injured member be reinstated.
In that case, etc. .
* Page 174. Interchange first and second
lines at top of
page.
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The following irregularities by election officials, in the absence of fraud,
have been held insufficient to support petitions contesting the'election; counting of ballots by persons other than the election officers, State ex rel. Hodge
v. Linn, zoo I1 397 (z88t) ; Roberts v. Calvert, 98 N. C. 58o,4 S.E. 127 (1887) ;
keeping polls open after the statutory closing time, Pratt v. People, 29 IllL 54
(1862) ; before completion of the count, judges adjourning to go home for
dinner, Du Page County v. People, 65 IlL 36o (1872); holding the election at
the county jail instead of at the court as prescribed by-law, Puckett v. Springfield, "97 Tenn. 264, 37 S. W. 2 (1896); contra, Melvin's Case, supra; opening the ballot box during the election in order to retrieve the clerk's pen
which had accidentally fallen therein, Bailey v. Hirst, xi3 Ky. 699 (x9o);
burning of election ballots after the count instead of preserving them, Hardin
v. Cress, 113 Ky. 734 (lgoz); counting votes before polls were closed, Ex
porte Williams, 35 Tex. Crim. 75, 31 S. W. 653 (1895); and under facts
similar to those in the principal case, the adjourning of the election officers td
a more comfortable room in a nearby hotel to finish the count after the election room had become dark and cold, Hall v. Martin, 183 Ky. 120 (zigp).
If, however, it appears that the general result of an election was probably
changed by reason of irregularities such as failing to open and close polls at
the proper time or at the proper place, the election may be invalidated, but
the burden of showing this lies upon the verson contesting the result as returned. Tebbe v. Smith, 1o8 Cal. 101, 41 Pac. 454 (x895) ; Goree v. Cahill, 35.
OkL 42, T28 Pac. z24 (19z2); Swick's Nomination, z Dist. & Cty. Rep. 417
(Pa. 192). It may be stated, therefore, as a general rule, that honest mistakes or mere omissions on the -part of election officers, or irregularities in
matters not mandatory, even though 'gross, if not fraudulent, will not avoid
an election, unless it can be shown that thcy affected the result or, at least,
rendered it uncertain.
EQUIzT-INJUNTboN-TRADE NAMES-GROUND or AcrioN.-For thirteen
years the plaintiff had been in the business of distributing to local consignees
goods received in bulk by him from a distance, under the name of the "Pittsburgh Diitributing Company." For -the -last three years of this period the defendant had conducted the same sort of business under the same name, although his line was restricted to liquors. The plaintiff sought an injunction
to restrain the defendant's use of the name on the ground that great confusion
in his correspondence had resulted therefrom. It was not alleged that the defendant was competing unfairly. Held: Injunction granted. Potter v. Osgood, 79 Pa. Super. 397 (192).
Ordinarily the sole ground for granting an injunction in cases of trademark infringement and other forms of unfair competition is that the respondent has deceived or is attempting to deceive the public to the injury of the
complainant. Higgins v. Higgins, i44N. Y. 462, 4r9 (i895); Kahn v. Diamond
Steel Co, 89 Fed. 707, 32 C. C. A. 374 (1898); Heller & Merz v. Shaver, 1o2
Fed. 88 (C. C. r9oo). It has frequently been adjudged that the relative
merits of the wares of the parties is not material. Edelston v. Edelston, z
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De g., J., & S. i85, i-g (Eng. 1863); Prince Co. v. Prince Paint Co, 135 N.
Y. 24, 39 (1892); Cleveland Stone Co. v. Wallace, 52 Fed. 431, 437 (C. C.
i89z). Some courts have declared that an injunction would lie only when the
parties were competitors. Nolan Bros. v. Nolan, 131 Cal 27r, 63 Pac. 48o
(xpoo); Sarton v. Schaden, 125 Iowa 696, 7o2 1i N. W. 5$I (x9o4); Regent
Shoe Co. v. Haaker, 7s Neb. 426, 431, xo6 N. W. 595 (19o5). Moreover, where
a manufacturer appropriated marks or a name for one, article in a class of
goods, he was protected from infringement against all those dealing in the
same class of. goods. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Garner, 54 How. Prac. 297, 302
(N. Y. 1876) ; Carrol v. Ertheiler, I Fed. 688 (C. C. i8go) ; Collins v. Ames, i8
Fed. 561 (C. C. i88-'). Wholesalers and retailers of the same article, however,
are not competitors. Nolan Bros. v. Nolan, supra; Regent Shoe Co. v. Haaker,
supra.
In the majority of jurisdictions,.proof of an intention to injure is required
if the alleged infringement is not of a trademark Elgin Vatch Co. v. Ill.
Watch Case Co, 179 U. S. 665, 45 L ed. 365, 21 Sup. Ct. 270 (i9oo); Gorham
Mfg. Co. v. Emery Co., io4 Fed. 243, 43 C. C. A. 5x (1900); Lynn Shoe Co.
v. Auburn Shoe Co. ioo Me. 461, 62 Atl. 499 (19o5). On the other hand, many
courts presume a friudulent intention from any infringement. Davis v. Ken8
dall, 2 R. 1. 566 (185o); Holmes et al. v. Holmes ct al., 37 Conn. 27 , 9 AtL
324 (87o); North Cheshire & Manchester Brewing Co. v. Manchester Brewing Co, L R. 24 App. Cas. 83 (Eng. 1898).
The court, in the principal case, based its decision on the "confusion in
the public mind" and the consequent "injury" to the plaintiff through delays
in the transmission of mail and telegrams. No cases have been found in
which these expressions had any meaning other than confusion in the mind of
the public as to whose goods it is buying, and the injury to the plaintiff of
having his trade stolen. The case of the American Clay Mfg. Co. v. Same,
198 Pa. 8, 47 Atl 936 (19o1), probably supports the decision in the principal
case, but in that case the parties did sell the same articles, and the court quite
possibly deemed them competitors, although unfair competition was not alleged in the declaration Aside from this case, there has been found only one
case where injury through delay in the delivery of messages was not part of a
general allegation of damages through unfair competition, as in Ball v. Best,
135 Fed 434 (C. C. 19o5) and Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn Shoe Co, supra.
The one case is Dr Kennedy Corp. v. Kennedy, 55 N. Y. S. 917 (App. Div.
1899). The defendant had sold his business and trade name to the plaintiff,
and the action was brought to restrain the former from receiving mail intended for the latter. The plaintiff wasseeking to enjoin a breach of the contract for the sale of the good will rather than to prevent unfair competition.
It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is considerably in
advance of any other decision on the general subject in Pennsylvania, and
that, even more than its predecessor, the American Clay Mlfg. Company's Case,
supra, it marks a distinct departure from the theory on which injunctions have
hitherto been granted in connection with infringements of trade names and
unfair competition.

RECENT CASES
EV1DE--SsoUC~T.-AD.1sS1BILflTY
OF CHILD 10 PRovE IDENTITY OF
FATHEr.-The plaintiff sued for the loss of his daughter's services resulting from her alleged seductionby the defendant. The court allowed the plaintiff over the defendant's objeCtion-to exhibit to the jury his daughter's child
to prove by resemblance the defendant's identity as its father. Held: No
error. Runkr v. Gantt, 113 S. F 581 (S. C. 1922).
Resemblance has always been, considered, both in and out of coirt, as
strong evidence of relationship. An early use of evidence of hi§ sort was
in support of claims of descent or allegations of partus .upporitio. In such
cases English courts permitted evidence of resemblance to be admitted, not
only by the introduction of the claimant for the jury's inspection, but from
oral testimony. The Douglas Case, : Hargr, Collect. Jurid.4o (Eng. 1769) ;
Day v. Day, Hubback, Evidence of Succession 384 (Eng. 1797); Morris v.
Davies, 3 Car. & P. 215 (Eng. 1827). Chief Justice Cockburn allowed the
claimant in the famous Tichborne Case in i87 to prove his parentage by comparison of his own features with those of his alleged parent in a portraitBy analogy the practice has been extended to cases of seduction, bastardy,
fornication or rape, in which it has often been dttempted to establish the
civil or criminal liability of the defendant by thus proving his identity. as
father of the child. In American courts, in general, the fact of resemblance
cannot be established by the oral testimony of witnesses, on the ground that
resemblance clearly comes under the opinion rule. U. S. v. Collins, i Cranch
592 (U. S. 1809); Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144, 152 0876); Shorten v. Judd.
s6 Kan. 43, 42 Pac. 337 (.89s). A majority of jurisdictions allow the child
to be exhibited to the jury for their inspection, regardless of its age, reservin
to the jury the right to disregard the evidence if they believe the child is toct
young to have any marked features. Gaunt v. State, 5o N. 3. L. 490 (1889) ;
Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, 26 N. E. 811 (i89i); Commonwealth v.
Pearl, 33 Pa. Super. 97 '(09o7). The minority never allow the introduction
of the child into evidence. Fuller v. Carney, 29 Hun. 47 (N. Y. z883) ; Robnett v. People, 16 IlL App. 2D (1895) ; Clark v. Bradstreet, 8o Me. 454 (1888).
These courts do not question- the relevancy of the fact of resemblance if
sufficiently proved. They wish to avoid any unfairness in the use of such
evidence, as unfairness might easily result from the practical difficulty of determing the fact reliably in the case of a very young child, whose features
are subject to constant change. Resemblance. ii the case of babies, in their
opinion, is apt to be fanciful.
A third vicv, applied in' some few jurisdictions, allows the trial judge to
determine whether or not the child is sufficiently matured to be submitted to
the jury's inspection for purposes of determining the fact of resemblance or
non-resemblance. State v. Smith, 54 Iowa io4 (198o) ; Shorten v. Judd, supra;
State Y. Danforth, 73 N. H. 215, 219 (I9o5). Although avoiding the evils of
indiscriminate admission or exclusion of infants in evidence, this View, it is
submitted, makes the admissibilfty of such evidence a matter of no certainty
at all, for the fact of "sufficient maturity" will vary, like equity, "with the
length of the" chancellor's foot." However, this is perhaps the best view.
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There is no difference of opinion about the admissibility of an infant in
evidence in order to prove the race of his father. 'Varlick. v. White, 76 N. C.
i75 (1877) ; Clark v. Bradstreet, supra; State v. Saidell, 70 N. H. 174 (i899).
FAWuD-E.E TION oF Rrm.EDiss-Bnu iN EQuITY To RESCUNM AS BAR TO
AcTioN AT LAw.-The plaintiff brought an action at law to recover damages
for the defendant's fraudulent acquisitioni of land. Previous to this-action, the
equity to have cancelled the defendants patents for
plaintiff had filed a bill itr
the same lands. Judgment had been awarded the defendant upon a plea of the
Statute of Limitations. The defendant set up this judgment as a defense
to the action at law. The plaintiff demurred and appealed from a judgment
overruling the demurrer. Held: (Brandeis, I., Holmes, 1., and Taft, C. I.,
dissenting.) Judgment affirmed. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., etc.,
o
United States Supreme Court, No. 4 ,October Term (T922).
The majority opinion was based upon the ground that the plaintiff, by
pursuing the bill in equity to a final decree after being aware of the defense
of the Statute of Limitations, had elected his remedy and could not later maintain what was an alternative and inconsistent action against the defendant for
the same cause. The dissenting opinion proceeded upon the reasoning that
there are two prerequisites for a successful plea of the election of a remedy by
the plaintiff: (x) there must actually have been two remedies available, and
(2) the second remedy must be inconsistent with the one previously invoked. Neither of these elements was present in the instant case, they believed, since: (r) the fact that the plaintiff government did not have a remedy
other than at law was established by. the unfavorable decree in equity, and
an action for deceit was not inconsistent with the bil in equity to annul
(2)
the patents.
The law is not settled as to what actions are inconsistent.- It has frequently been stated, as a general rule, that a party who has been induced into
a contract by fraud, cannot both rescind the contract and maintain an action
of deceit for damages. Wilson v. New U. S. Ranch Co., 73 Fed. 94, 2o C.
C. A. 24r (M8g6); 2A C. J. i8. Although an action of deceit for the fraud is
based upon the tort and not upon the contract, it is considered a ratification of
the transaction fraudulently procured, and'as such is inconsistent with an
action for rescission. Heastings v. McGee, 66 Pa. 384 (i87); McCready v,.
Phillips, 56 Neb. 446, 76 N. AV. 885 O88).
On the other hand, one who seeks cancellation of a contract on the
ground of fraud does not obtain adequate relief until he'is placed in status
quo. If a simple rescission and return of his part of the consideration does
not have this effect, then the plaintiff is entitled also to.an action of deceit for
the damages sustained by him. Atlanta & La. G. R. Co. v. Hodnett, 29 Ga.
461 (x89s) ; Warren v. Cole, i5 Mich. .6S (i67). So it appears that while
an action on the case for deceit affirms a contract and is an election of a
remedy which bars subsequent actions, a suit for annulment, as in the instant
case, does not preclude a later action of deceit for damages caused by the
defendant's tort. The two suits, in the latter case, are 'not considered in-
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consistent. McRae v. Lonsby, x3o Fed. 17, 64 C. C. A. 385 (1904); Wright v.
Chandler, 173 S. IV. 1173 (Tex. 1915); 27 C 3. I.&
So in the principal case, even had the plaintiff received a favorable decree in equity, under the prevailing rule of law, he would have still been
entitled to an action of deceit as an opportunity to prove damages for which
he had not been compensated. It is submitted that the plaintiff did not lose
this right by virtue of the fact that he did not succeed in the equitable
action.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-OPTION To RENEw-RELiEF AGA NsT FORFEIT-

uar.---The plaintiff held a five year lease with an option to renew on notice
given at least thirty days before the end of the term. He had spent a great
deal of money in making improvements on the premises, but forgot to give
notice of his intention to renew on time. The plaintiff sought a mandatory
injunction ordering the defendant to renew the lease. Judgment was given
for the defendant. Held: New trial granted. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 118 AtL
-47 (Conn. xqzz).
When a tenant has an option to renew his lease upon the giving of notice
before the end of the term, time is generally held to be of the essence of the
contract. The giving of notice on time is, therefore, a condition precedent
to the right to renew. Nicholson v. Smith, L R (883) 2z Ch. D. 61o; Murtand v. English, 214 Pa. 325, 63 AtL 882 (iro6); Doepfner v. Bowers, 55 N. Y.
Misc. 561, io6 N. Y. S. 932 (19o7). Although equity abhors a forfeiture, it
will not usually relieve from a forfeiture of the option to renew on breach
of a condition precedent. Doepfner v. Bowers,'supra. Relief may sometimes
be granted even on breach of a condition precedent, if compensation in money
can be made for the breach. Selden v. Camp, 95 Va. 527, 28 S. E. 877 (1898).
But failure to give notice is generally held to be such a breach as cannot be
compensated in money. Doepfner v. Bowers, supra; Dikeman v. Sunday Creek
Coal Co., z84 II1. 545, 56 N. E. 864 (igoo). Even when compensation cannot
be made, equity may relieve on the ground of fraud, accident or mistake. New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Rector of St. George's Church, 12 Abbott N. C.
5o (N. Y. 1883). The Irish courts formerly granted relief in cases of fraud,
accident, mistake, or even negligence when the negligence was slight. Lennon
v. Napper, 2 Sch. & Lef. 681 (Ir. ISo). But it is questionable whether this
doctrine was ever applied in the English courts except to cases arising in Iieland where there was a local equity in favor of the tenant in such cases, recognized by statute. Boyle v. Lysaght, x Ridgw. 384 (Ir. 1787). At any rate,
a different rule now obtains in England, and equity will not relieve the tenant
from forfeiture due to such breach, whether caused by accident, mistake or
negligence. Reid v. Blagrave, 9 L.3. (0. S.) Ch. 245 (Eng. 1831); Nicholson
v. Smith, supra. In the United States until the principal case was decided, in
only one jurisdiction (Maryland) had relief been granted from forfeiture
when the breach was due to negligence. Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 2of (1876);
Worthington v. Lee, 6x lid. 530 (1883). But in all cases, gross negligence
is a bar to equitable relief. Myers v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882) ; Greville v.
Parker, L R. (igro) A. C. 325.
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In the only American cases in which relief was granted when the giving
of notice was omitted through negligence, the original lease was for a long
term, such as ninety-nine years. The court in those cases held, it seems justifiably, that the parties intended perpetual leases, and that therefore time was
not of the essence of the covenant for renewal. Banks v. Haskie, supra;
Worthington v. Lee, supra. In the principal case the original lease was for
only five years, and it was definitely stipulated that notice should be given at
least thirty days before the expiration of the term. Moreover the equities
were strongly in favor of the plaintiff for as the court said: "The delay has
been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and . . . not to grant relief
would result in such hardship to the tenant as to malke it unconscionable to
enforce literally the condition precedent of the lease." Yet the case goes further than any other modern case upon this subject in relieving him from the
forfeiture of his option.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS---CoExTENSIVE SCHOOL DIsTRICr AND BOROUGH-

BORROWNG CAPACITY OF SCHooL DiSTRicT.-The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought
to restrain the school board of the school district from proceeding to make
an appropriation in order to erect a high school. As the borough and the
school district were coextensive, he contended that in determining the limitation upon the borrowing power of the school district, the debt of the borough
and the debt of the school district were to be taken collectively. 'If this were
a correct position, the school board would not have the right to increase the
district debt by the proposed amount. Held: The debt of the school district
alone should be considered in determining the constitutional limit of its borrowing capacity. Lyon v. Strock, 274 Pa. 54 (1922).
School districts created by the legislatures for the administration of the
school systems are regarded as quasi-municipal corporations with the most
limited powers known to the law. Ford v. Kendall School District, 121 Pa.
543, 15 AtI. 812 (z8S); Atchison Board of Education v. De Kay, 148 U. S.
591, 37 L. ed. 573 (1892), Pasadena School District v. Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7,
134 Pac. 985 (19x3). The School Code of Pennsylvania provides: "The board
of school directors in any school district . . . may create and incur an indebtedness against any such school district . . . to any amount that the
total indebtedness of such school district . . . shall never exceed seven
per centum upon the assesoed value of the taxable property for school purposes therein." Act of June 4, 1915, P. L 844, 845. And according to Section
8, Article IX, of the State Constitution "The debt of any city, borough, or
other municipality shall never exceed seven per centum upon the assessed
value of the taxable property therein." It is universally held that the legislature may give corporations that exist within the same boundaries separate
powers of taxation. Wilson v. Chicago, 133 Ill.
443, .27 N. E. 203 (189o);
City of Huron v. Montpelier Life Ins. Co., 94 Fed. 324, 36 C. C. A. 278 (1899);
Kansas v. Freeman, 67 Kan. go, 58 Pac. 959 (1899).
Because the courts recognize boroughs, school districts and other municipal corporations as being distinct entities, a school district is regarded as a
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separate municipality, for the purpose of limiting its borrowing capacity. Tuttle v. Polk, 92 Ia.-.41, 6o N. IN. 733 (1894); City of Huron v. Montpelier
Life Ins. Co., supra. Hence, in determining its present borrowing capacity under the Constitution, only its own existing debt should be considered. State ex
rel. Marinette Railway Co. v. City of Tomahawk, 96 Wis. 73 (1897); Campbell v. Indianapolis, 155 Ind. 213, 57 N. E. 92o (ipoo) ; Vallelly v. Grand Fork,
16 N. D. 23, ixr N. W. 15x5 (19o7).
The principal case which is one of first impression in Pennsylvania is in
accord with cases decided elsewhere on this point. The result of such a construction is that the same property included within the limits of the two corporations is subject to taxation for the debts of each. Tuttle v. Polk, .sutra;
City of Newport, ex Part, 141 Ky. 329, 32 S. V. 38o (1g9o).
NEGL!GENcE-APPLICATION oF REs IPSA IOQUITUR DOCTRNE To AuTomoBILES.--The defendant parked his car in the street and entered a saloon. After
three minutes he returned and found that the machine had proceeded some
distance up hill and had hit the plaintiff. There was no evidence as to how
the machine started. Held: This was sufficient to allow the jury to infer
that' the accident had occurred through the defendant's negligence. Helfrich
v. Gurnars, 78 Pa. Super. 449 (1922).
t
Ordinarily the defendant cannot be presumed negligent merely because
the plaintiff has sustained injury. Patton v. Texas R. R- Co, 179 U. S. 638,
45 L ed. 36, 21 Sup. Ct. -5 (igoo); Kingsley v. Delaware, etc., R. I. Co,
81 N. J. L 536, So At. 327 (igiz). But where the injury was caused by
something in the control of the defendant and the "accident" was of a sort
which, in the natural course of events, would not have been occasioned by
the thing if properly managed, then the mere proof of the accident establishes a presumption that the defendant was negligent. This is the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. See 70 U. bF PA. L REV. io (i921-22).
Alt courts apply this doctrine in cases where a passenger is injured by
machinery and appliances used by a common carrier. New Jersey, etc., R. R.
Co. v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 34i, 22 L ed. 877 (U. S. 1874); Harrison v. Sutter
So. R. R. Co., 134 Cal. 549, 66 Pac. 787 (igoi); Flwood v. Connecticut Ry. &
St. Co., 77 Conn. 145, 58 Atl. 751 (i9o4). The majority of courts go further
and apply the rule in many other cases, as, for example, where a pedestrian
was injured by a falling wall, Cork v. Blossom, 162 Mass. 33o, 38 N. E. 495
(1894); Ryder v. Kinsey, 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. V. 94 (8.95); Hall v. Gage,
nx6 Ark. so, 172 S. NV. 833 (1914); or by a runaway horse. Gorsuch v.
Swan, i19 Tenn. 36, 69 S. XV. 1113 (1902); Dennery v. Great, etc., Co., 82 N.
j. L Si7, Sr AtL. 86t (i9xi); Rosenberg v. Dahl, 162 Ky. 92, 172 S. V. 113
(1915).
Although for a long while the doctrine of rer ipsa loquitur received a very
limited application in Pennsylvania, Pawling v. Hoskins, 132 Pa. 6,1, 19 AtL
3o ('89o); Mixter v. Imperial Coal Co., i52 Pa. 395, 25 Atd. 587 .(8&3);
Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co., 184 Pa. 59, 39 AtL 292 (18W); see, generally, 70 U. OF PA. L. Ra. io5 (i92-22); the more recent tendency has
been more liberal, especially when the element of exclusive control in the de-
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fendant is shown. Thus the presumption was allowed to operate in a case
where the plaintiff's plate glass window was broken by one of the defendant's
linemen dropping a telephone box through it, Hauer v. Erie Electric Co., 51
Pa. Super. 613 (1912), and where a nearby resident was injured by an explosion during the defendant's blasting operations. Rafferty v. Davis, 260 Pa.
563, 1o3 AUt. 95 (1918).
The instant case, therefore, appears to be merely another illustration, fully
justifiable under the facts, of this tendency of the Pennsylvania courts to
allow the res ipsa loquitur doctrine a wider application.
NEGLIGENCE-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-RES
INJURY

IPSA LoQUITUR APPLIED TO

By X-RAY.-The plaintiff was severely burned as a result of ex-

posure to an X-ray machine operated by the defendant, a physician. The
trial judge in effect charged that the jury could draw an inference of negligence from the mere fact that the bum resulted. Held: The charge was erroneous. Stemons v. Turner, 274 Pa. 228 (z922).
There are comparatively few decisions on the subject of X-ray bums,
and they are about equally divided as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied. For the basis of the doctrine, see the Recent Case immediately spm.
The courts of Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington and Kansas have
applied the res ip.ra loquitur doctrine to the case of X-ray bums. Sauer v.
Smits, 49 Wash. 557, 95 Pac. io97 (i9o8) ; Holt v. Ten Broeck, 134 Minn. 458,
i59 N. W. io73 (1916). The bum was held to be "some evidence in itself"
of negligence in Shockley i,.Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, i3 N. W. 36o (ipoS);
George v. Shannon, 92 1Kans. 8oy, 142 Pac. 967 (1914); Evans v. Clapp, 23V'
S. W. '9(Mo. 1921). These decisions follow the electric light cases in which
the electric companies were held liable for injuries to the consumer caused
by touching a faulty wiring or bulb, entirely within the company's control. See
65 U. oF PA. L. REv. 5o6 (1916-17).
But the principal case, the first on this subject in Pennsylvania, is in Record with decisions in New York, Maryland, Arkansas, Virginia and the District of Columbia, which refuse to apply the doctrine to X-ray cases. And the
fact of injury has not, in those jurisdictions, been held presumptive evidence
of negligence or lack of skill in defendant. Sweeney v. Erving, 35 App. D. C.
57 (19io) ; Antovill v. Friedman. 188 N. Y. S. 777 (1921) ; Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S. W. 39 (i92i). However, it has been held a circumstance to be considered. Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S. E. 36o
(1918). These jurisdictions require of an operator of an'X:ray machine only
the same degree of skill and care as of a physician and surgeon generally,
which is that degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by members of his
profession in the same line of practice. See 29 YALE L J. 684 (i920). Therefore they are subject to the same and no greater liability, Henslin v. Wbeaton, 91 Minn. 2ig, 97 N. IV. 882 (i9o4) ; Hales v. Raines, T46 Mo. App. 232,
The same rule applies to an
130 S. W. 425 (i92o) ; Evans v. Clapp, 4.ipr.
operator of an X-ray machine who is not a physician. Holt v. Ten Broeck

.supra.
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The principal case and the other decisions in which the maxim of res
ipsa loquitur is not applied to X-ray burns, are in accord with the principles
generally governing the relation between physician and patient. These cases
are the more recent ones and show a much more careful study of the X-ray,
its properties and development, and particularly recognize that some few persons have physical idiosyncrasies which make them supersensitive to its effects. In these instances, burns will occasionally result in spite of the best
care and skill of the operator. It is obvious, therefore, that since the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is based on the theory that if properly used, no injury could possibly result, it cannot logically be applied to X-ray burns.
NuISANcs--In an
NEGLIENCE-IN3uRIS To CHiLr.-EN-ATrmAcrxi,
abandoned cellar on the defendant's land water accumulated, clear in appearance, but in fact dangerously poisoned by chemicals. The plaintiff's children came on the land, biathed in the water, were poisoned and died. There
was no indication that the water could be seen from the highway. Held: The
defendant was not liable. United Zinc & Chemlical Co. v. Britt, 42 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 299 (1922).
The plaintiff, a child of eight, climbed the trellis work of the defendant's
bridge in quest of a bird's nest, touched a live wire and sustained injuries for
"which he claimed damages. Held: The defendant railroad was not liab!e.
New York, Ncw Havcen & Hartford R. 1?. Co. v. Fruchter,U. S. Adv. Ops.
30 (1922-23).
In both of these cases the attractive nuisance or "turn-table" doctrine
was relied upon for recovery. This doctrine seems to have arisen, in the first instance, in Lynch v. Nurden, x Q. B. 29 (Eng. 1841), was adopted in this country
in Sioux City R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1873), and is now followed
in the majority of jurisdictions. 70 U. OF PA. L. REv. z4o, 241 (192-22). It
is founded on the principle that a land-owner owes a duty to safeguard infant trespassers from dangerous machinery to which they are attracted by
their natural instincts of play; the theory is that temptation supplies the placq
of invitation. Sioux City R. R. v. Stout, supra; Union P. R. Co. v. McDonald,
152 U. S. 262 (1894).
In the Britt Case, however, the children became wilful trespassers before
they discovered the fatal pool, thus eliminating the possible application of the
legal fiction that the attractiveness of the thing amounted to an implied invitation to the children. See 63 U. OF PA. L. Rev. 691 (1914-15). In the Fruchter
Case the court dismissed the plaintiff's action solely on the ground of the decision reached in the former case. But it would appear that there is a sharp
distinction to be drawn between the two cases. Whereas in both cases the
children were trespassers and in neither case did they become so because of
an "attractive nuisance," yet it is difficult to see just what constituted the attractive danger in the Fruchter Case. The thing that attracted the child-the
hope of finding a bird's nest-was not the thing that caused the injury.
That there is a tendency to limit the turn-table doctrine to dangerous
and attractive machinery which could readily have been safeguarded by the
owner, is admitted even in those jurisdictions where the doctrine is rigorously
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applied. Richards v. Connell, 45 Neb. 467, 63 N. XV. 915 (1895); Stendal v.
Boyd, 73 Minn. 53, 75 N. NV. 735 (1898) ; Savannah F. & V. R. Co. v. Beavers,
113 Ga. 398, 39 S. E. 82 (igoi). A vigorous dissenting opinion, in the Britt
Case, contended that the decision reached by the majority of the court flatly
overruled the Stout and McDonald cases. It is-submitted that although the
Britt Case limits the turn-table doctrine, it can scarcely be said to repudiate it.
See Jeremiah Smith, "Liability of Land-owner to Children Entering Without
Permission, ii H. Av. L REv. 349 (z897-98).
NEGLIGExNc-LABLITY OF MANUFAC"TURER TO PERSONS NO? ix P IVITY OF
CoxRAcr.-The defendant manufactured sparklers intended for use by children, advertising them to be safe and harmless. The plaintiff, a seven-yearold girl, purchased a box of these sparklers from a merchant. While "making
one go around," she set fire to her dress. Held: The defendant was liable.
Henry v. Crook ct al., 195 N. Y. S. 642 (App. Div. 1922).
The general rule has been that a manufacturer of an article is not liable
for negligence in its construction to persons who have no contractual relation with him. Winterbottom v. Wright, lo M. & W. 1o9 (Eng. 1842); Curtain v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 At. 244 (x891); Standard Oil Co. v. Murray,
ix9 Fed. 572, 57 C. C. A. I (0o2). By way of exception to that rule, the
courts have imposed a duty upon the manufacturer to give sufficient warning
of the character of the article he manufactures: (x) where the article is inherently dangerous to life or health, Norton v. Sewall, io6 Mass. j43 (187o) ;
Bishop v. Weber, i39 Mass. 4I1, 1 N. B. 154 (885); Peterson v. Standard Oil
Co., 55 Ore. 511; io6 Pac. 337 (19o); see 58 U. OP PA. L. Rav. 445 (igogo) ; and (2) where he has been negligent in its construction and the article becomes dangerous when used for the purpose intended. Lewis v. Terry, III
Cal. 39 (1896); Woodward v. Miller, xx9 Ga. 618 (i9o3); Kuelling v. Lean
Manufacturing' Co., 183 N. Y. 78 -(0o5). But generally, where the article
is of a class ordinarily harmless and the defect is not known to the manufacturer, he is not liable to persons not in privity of contract. Huset v. J. I.
Case Threshing Machine Co, 120 Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237 (i9o3); frquardt v. Ball Engine Co., "22Fed. 374, 58 C. C. A. 455 (i9o3); Cadillac
Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. Sox, 261 Fed. 878 (z915).
In recent years, however, there has been a marked tendency in some jurisdictions to upset the old rules and impute to the manufacturer a knowledge of
the quality of the articles lie puts on the market. Thus, in Armstrong Packing
Co. v. Clem, 151 S. W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), a manufacturer was held
bound to know that soap' contained ingredients which unless neutralized by
saponification would remain poisonous. In Davidson v. Montgomery Ward
Co., 171 11. App. 355 (1912), a manufacturer of a fly-wheel was held bound
to make sure that it was safe before selling it. An extreme case is that of
Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 2
Mass. 593, 1o8 -. E. 4 (1915),
where it was decided that one who put out a floor varnish as his own, though
bought from another maker, was presumed to know that the ingredients from
which it was compounded made it inflammable and intrinsically dangerous. Of

RECEIVT CASES
all the states, New York is perhaps the most stringent in construing the liability of the manufacturer. That jurisdiction has held that the manufacturer
owes a duty to warn the public of the nature of his article where there is the
slightest possibility that injury will result from the use thereof. Upon that
principle a manufacturer of a defective article has been held liable whether
he actually knew of the defect or not. Torgeson v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 156,
84 N. E. 956 (i9o8); Statler v. Ray Manufacturing Co, 195 -N. Y. 478, 88 N.
E. io63 (19o9); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, mt N. E.
ioso (1916).
Closely analogous to the principal case on its facts is Herman v. Markham Rifle Co, 258 Fed. 475 (1918), where the court went so far as to hold
that an air rifle sold as a children's toy was inherently dangerous. See 68
But the court in the principal case beU. or PA. L REv. 191 (pipi-26).
lieves that an ordinarily harmless sparkler cannot be considered inherently
dangerous. Likewise the manufacturer's liability could not be established on
the ground of the recent New York cases cited above because in the principal
case there was no defect in the construction of the sparkler. Recognizing the
impossibility of aligning the principal case with those that have gone before it,
the court makes a further extension of the New York doctrine and establishes
the principle that where an article is used with the assurance of the manufacturer that it is harmless and an injury results, the manufacturer is liable
because of his failure to instruct the intended consumer of the true qualities
of his product.
PIYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-PoWERS OF STATE BOARD OF M DICAL EXAMIN-

Eas.-A Kansas statute provided that the State Board of Medical Registration and Examination should give examinations to all candidates seeking
licenses to practice medicine and surgery, except in certain specified cases.
The defendant board promulgated a rule that it would e:.amine only graduates
of those colleges which are listed as Class A by the American Medical Association, basing its right to do so on the provision of the statute that the Board
might "formulate rules to govern its actions:' The plaintiff, a graduate of a
Class C college which had been approved when last inspected by the defendant, sought by a writ of mandamus to compel the board to give him an
examination. Held (Dawson and West, J. J., dissenting): The writ will not
issue. Jones v Kansas State Board of Medical Registration and Examination,
2o8 Pac. 639 (Han. 1922).
The legislatures of the various states have created boards to regulate admission to the medical profession, and havi- given them limited powers. As to
Pennsylvania, see the Act of May 18, 1893, P. L 94. The right to grant
licences is construed as being within the police power of the state. State Medical Board v. McCrary, 77 Ark 6xx, 92 S. WV.775 (1912) ; People v, Love, 298
Il. 304, 3r N. E. So9 (:92:). As to the constitutionality of the statutes, see
7o U. OF PA. L. RE%. 53. Generally, the statutes specify the rules and regulations by which the boards shall be governed, and the only duty of the board
is to act in accordance with them. Reetz v. Michigan, 1SS U. S.So5, 47 L. ed
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563 (i9o2); People v. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill.
iS, 95 N. E. 995 (rgpr). Their
duties are strictly of an administrative or ministerial character, State ex rel.
Granville v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 123 (1884) ; and they perform no judicial functions. Mleffert v. State Board of Medical Registration, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac.
247 (1903).

In some instances the courts allow the boards to use their discretion. For
example, they may decide whether or not a college is a "reputable" one, or in
"good standing," when such terms are used in the statutes. State ex rel Kirchgessuer v. Board of Health, 53 N. J.L 594, 22 AtL 226 (i8gi) ; State er rel.
Coffey v. Chittenden, 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. V. 587 (i902); State v. Clark, 230
S. W. 6og (Mo. i921). But, it has been held that "good standing" cannot be
made to depend merely on the fact that a college has not complied with a
resolution of the board requiring every college to furnish the board with a
list of its matriculates. State v. Lutz, 136 Mo. 633, 38 S.W. 323 (x895). The
use of the discriminatory powers of the boards is subject to review by
the courts and will be controlled by mandamus. State v. Miller, 146 Ia. 52i,
124 N. W. 167 (1i1o); State v. Clark supra; State ex rel. McCleary v. AdtLoc,

206 Mo. 55o, 105 S. W. 270 (1907).

These boards are generally held to have only such powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon them. Bentley v. State
Board of Medical Examiners, 152 Ga. 836; Ill S. E. 379 (192). The statute
in the principal case definitely stated the classes of persons who might be admitted to and rejected from examinations. It is maintained in vigorous dissenting opinions that the board by making such an arbitrary rule assumed the
duties of the legislature. It is, of course, a familiar maxim that legislative
powers cannot be delegated. h; rc Kollock, 16s U. S. 526, 4 L. ed. 813 (1896).
It is questionable whether tbe legislature intended that the board, in the principal case, should have power to pass such a ruling and it seems equally doubtful that the provision allowing it to "formulate rules to govern its actions"
constituted sufficient authority for it.
REAL PROPERTY--ErFFECT OF STATUTE OF QUIA EMPTORES UPON SUBINFEUDATio" DY TENANTS IN CAPiTrE-By charter in 12o3 King John granted a manor

to be held in knights' service. In 1837 the then lord of the manor enfranchised lands to be held in free and common socage, thereby creating a freehold in fee simple. In 191o the successor died intestate and without heirs.
Held: The lands escheated to the crown and not to the lord of the manor. Re
Thomas Holliday, 127 Law Times R. 585 (Eng. x922).
This is probably the first case directly holding that a tenant in capite or
ut de corona cannot subinfeudate, since in the cases on which the principal
case purports to be based the principle was only broadly stated. Chetwode v.
Ciew, L. R. Willes Rep. 614 (Eng. 1745); Bradshaw v. Lawson, L. 1. 4
Term. Rep. 443 (Eng. 1791). The reasons for the decision given in the principal case are: (x) that the Statute of Quia Emplores abolished subinfeudation
by tenants it capite; because the Statute De Praerogaifva Regis, usually cited
17 Edw. z, only restricted subinfendation by tenants in capite, but this statute
wvais
passed at the beginning of Edw. I's reign (and not 17 EdW. 2); and part
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of Quia Emptores embodies the subject-matter of this statute; (2) that the
Statute of 12 Car. 2, c. 24 (Eng. x66o) changed tenures of services to the king
into free and common socage, thereby bringing them under Quia Emptores.
Either of these reasons would have been sufficient for the decision.
Where feudal holdings have been abolished Quia Emptores has no application. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, Sec. 23 (2d ed. i9o6). The statute
was brought to this country by the colonists and is part of the law where tenures exist. Van Rensslaer v. Hays, x9 N. Y. 68 (1859) ; I Kent Com. 473 (5th
ed. 1&44). However, in Pennsylvania it has been held that Quid Emptore$
was never operative, Ingersoll v. Sergeant, i Whart. 337 (Pa. 1836), and, later,
that tenure does not exist. Wallace v. Hampstad, 44 Pa. 492 (1863).
Where the statute has been adopted, there logically can be no possibility
of reverter after a determinable fee. These rights are reversionary rights,
which implies tenure, and Quia Emptores puts an end to tenure between
feoffer of an estate in fee simple and feoffee. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, Secs. 31, 32 (2d ed, i9o6); Pollock, Land Laws 226 (3d ed. xi86). Notwithstanding this cojiclusion, in many of these states the'courts have'held
that there may be determinable or base fees and possibilities of reverter. See
i Tiffany, Real Property 194 (i9o3), and cases there cited. In Pennsylvania
there may be determinable fees. Penna. Railroad Co. v. Parke, 42 Pa. 31
(1862); Henderson v. Hunter, s9 Pa. 135 (1868); Slegal v. Laner, 148 Pa.

236 (18g2).
It is submitted that in those jurisdictions which recognize determinable
fees, if a determinable fee is granted the principal case would not be followed but, since a fee simple absolute was granted in the principal case, it
would be followed in grants of absolute fees in all jurisdictions.
TENANCY By ENTIRETIES-EFFCT OF DivoRce-Durn To ACCOUNT.-The
plaintiff and defendant held an estate by entireties. After they had been
divorced, the husband, the defendant, continued to receive all the rentals from
the estate. The plaintiff sued in assumpsit for an accounting. Hcd: The
defendant must account. O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 58, 1x6 AtL Soo (192z).
At common law, a tenancy by entireties was created when land was
conveyed or devised to a man and wife in language which did not specifically
indicate another form of tenancy. Because of the unity of the parties there
was, in the theory of the law, but one estate. Tiffany, Real Property, Sec.
65. Hence, according to the weight of authority, as divorce severed the
unity of the parties, it also severed the unity of the estate. Because the
parties, being then single, could not become tenants by entireties, they could
not continue as such. Owing to the modem prejudice against joint tenancies,
the parties are now considered as tenants in common after the divorce. Steltz
v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 63, 28 N. E. Sio (i89r) ; Russel v. Russel, x22 Mo. 235, 26
S. IV. 677 (894); Sharpe v. Baker, Si Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627 (1912).
It would seem perhaps more logical to make divorced tenants by entireties
such tenants as they would have been according to the language of the original conveyance, had they not been married. The divorced persons, being
tenants in common, naturally have the right to compel an account.
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The decision in the principal case, however, is based on other grounds. In
Pennsylvania and Michigan, it is held by the courts that a tenancy by entireties cannot become anything else by a divorce; that the estate is created as
much by the language of the devise as by the fact of unity of persons. Hence,
if the element of unity disappears, the estate is not thereby destroyed, but
merely loses those features which pertained, not to the estate, but to the unity
of persons The wife at common law could not compel an accounting by her
husband of profits received from land held by entireties-not because of the
nature of the estate, but because of the husband's absolute control of all
profits from land held by the wife in any way. But once dissolve the marriage
bond, and there is no presumption that such profits will be expended for the
use of both tenants. In these jurisdictions, therefore, the tenant who receives
the profits may be held to an account by the other, since the law will imply a
promise to divide such profits equally. Appeal of Lewis, 85 Mich. 34o, 48 N.
W. 58o (i8g); Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604 (i9o6).
As accounting would, therefore, be proper under either theory, the decision in the principal case would seem to be a correct one. It is submitted
that the reasoning followed in the majority of jurisdictions does not seem so
logical as that used in Pennsylvania and Michigan.
TRUSTS--BEUESTS FOR CHARITABLE USFs-DEFNITE PURMSE AND BENEICTARIEs.-The plaintiff, as heir-at-law of the testator, brought a bill in eqiuity
to have declared void the following bequest: "And after the decease of my
said niece, I desire . . . all income derived from the investments to be
given to the oldest respectable inhabitants in Gunville, to the amount of five
shillings per week." The power of selection was given to certain trustees.
Held: The testator created a valid charitable trust. Re Lucas, Rhys v. AnyGeneral, x27 Law Times R. 272 (Eng. x922).
It is generally held, with the exception of a few jurisdictions hereinafter
noted, that if a charitable trust is otherwise valid, it will not fail because of
indefiniteness of purpose, if from the testator's words the court can construe
the true meaning to be for the benefit of the poor. Re Dudgeon; Truman v.
Pope, 74 Law Times R. 613 (Eng. x896); Grant v. Saunders, T2I Iowa 8o
U. oF PA. L REv. 59 (92i-i922). The court in the principal
(iqo3). See 7"o
case said that the words "oldest respectable inhabitants" clearly showed the
testator's intention to aid the aged and needy. Although his construction is in
line with the modern tendency of the courts to carry out, when possible, the
testator's bequest, Johnson v. Holtfield, 79 Ala. 423 (iS85); Speer v. Colbert,
200 U. S. :3o, 26 Sup. Ct. 2oi (igo6), yet no case has been found which goes
as far. It is submitted that the true construction of the words indicates that
the testator was inspired more by loyalty to his village than by a desire to assist the poor. The motivd is, of course, immaterial except as evidence of the
intention. The purpose of the gift seems almost too vague and indefinite to
be upheld as a charitable trust.
In America, there are certainly some jurisdictions which would not follow the case. Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Virginia, West Virginia and
Wisconsin are states in which the English Statute of Elizabeth, validating
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charitable trusts, has never been considered part of the common law and no
corresponding statutes have been passed. Consequently their courts enforce
only trusts in which the beneficiaries are sufficiently definite to have a standing in a court of equity. Maught v. Getzendanner, 65iMd. 527, 5 AtL 471
(r886) ; Fosdick v. Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581, 26 N. E. Sox (1891); Jordan
v. Convention Trustees, io7 Va. 79, 57 S. E. 652 (19o7).
VNDOR AND VENDEz-JUoarENT OBTAINED BY CLAIMANT OF TITLE AGAINST

VENDFE CoxcLusi% AGAINST VENDOR WHo WAR.ANTE TiTLm--NoricE.-The
vendee of an automobile who was sued for its possession notified his vendor
to assist with the defense. The vendor appeared at the trial with counsel and
made some suggestions for the defense. Judgment was rendered against the
vendee. Subsequently the vendee sued the vendor for breach of his warranty. Held: Thej judgment against the vendee in the previous action is conclusive against the vendor. Southern Motors Corp. v. Gayle Motor Co., 92
So. 784 (Ala. 922).
The doctrine has long been settled that if a vendee of real estate properly
notifies his vendor, who had -warranted the title, that the title is claimed by
another and that it is to be tried, the vendor is conclusively bound by a judgment subsequently rendered against the vendee -when the vendee later sues the
vendor on the warranty. Paul v. Witman, 3 W. and S. 407, 409 (Pa. 1842);
Morgan ct al. v. Muldoon, 82 Ind. 347 (1832); Coke, Lit. 1o (b) .[VoL. i;
Hargrave and Butler, xsth ed, s794]. This ancient doctrine by analogy has
been extended to every case "where a person is responsible over to another by
operation of law or by express contract." Littleton v. Richardson, 34 N. -L
,87 (i8s6) ; Beers v. Pinney, 12 Wend. 309 (N. Y. 1834) ; Carpenter v. Pier,
30 Vt. 8r, 87 (z858). Accordingly it is applied in cases of warranty of title
to personal property. A part of the contract of warranty is that the warrantor
shall defend the title, because he has the advantage of better information, thus
precluding the necessity of trying the same title over again. Davis v. Wilbourne, x Hill 27- (S. C. 1832); Jacob v. Pierce, 2 Rawle 2o3 (Pa. 1828);
Bevan v. Muir, 53 Wash. 54, ioi Pac. 485 (xio9). The principle, however,
has been held not to apply where the action is one of warranty of soundness.
Morgan v. Winston, 2 Swan 412 (Tenn. 1852); Smith v. Moore, 7 S. C. 209
(,87s).
As to the form of notice to the vendor, it is generally held that it need
not be in writing. It must, however, be actual and not constructive. Jacob v.
Pierce, mspra; Cummings v. Harrison, 57 Miss. 275 (zS79) ; Hersey v. Long, 30
Minn. i14, 14 N. WV. oS8 (1883). Mere knowledge on the vendor's part is,
therefore, not sufficient. Sampson v. Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200 (1863); Collins v.
Baker, 6 Mo. App. 538 (1879).
There is a conflict of authority as to whether it is necessary for the
vendee to request the vendor to assume the defense in the action brought by
the person claiming title. Some courts have declaied that mere notice of the
forgan v. Muldoon, supra; City of Boston v.
pending action is sufficient.
Worthington et al., 76 Mass. 496 (858) ; Harding v. Larkin, 41 Ill. 413 (866).
Others have decided that the warrantor must be expressly requested by the
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vendee to defend the action. Hersey v. Long, supra; Buchanan v. Kauffmann,
65 Tex. 235 (i88s); Wheelock v. Overshiner, iio Mo. ioo, xg S. IV. 640
(1892). The notice must be given a reasonably sufficient time ahead to allow
the warrantor to defend the action against the vendee, not later than the time
when the defendant's pleadings must be filed. Davis v. Wilbourne, supra;
Somers v. Schmidt, 24 Wis. 417 (x869). The Pennsylvania courts, it seems,
require a request on the warrantor to defend the action. Paul v. Witman,
supra. Where the warrantor appears at the trial to aid in the defense or even
to testify, it is held that he is bound by the judgment no matter how he was
notified. Barney v. Dewey, 13 Johnson 224 (N. Y. 1816); Hopkins v. Conrad
& Lancaster, 2 Rawle 3T6, 325 (Pa. i83o) (dictum); Carpenter v. Pier,
supra; Morgan v. Muldoon, suPra.
Since, in the principal case, the warrantor assisted in the defense, the
point as to whether or not a request to assume the whole defense was necessary did not have to be decided. The case is in accord with the general
authority holding participation in the trial sufficient.
VaaRlcr-AFFIDAVIT OF JUROR IMPFACIIINO SA.E.-Several days after a
jury was discharged, one of the jurymen made an affidavit to the effect that
he had not heard the foreman's verdict and that the verdict rendered was not
that of the jury. Thereupon the plaintiff applied for a new trial. Held: New
trial granted.

Ellis v. Deheer, 127 L T. 431 (1922).

It is a well-settled rule that an affidavit of a juror is inadmissible to show
that the verdict was arrived at by mistake, irregularity, or misconduct in the
jury room. Vaise v. Delaval, i T. R. ii (Eng. r785) ; Knowlton v. McMahon,
13 Minn. 386 (x868); Woodward v. Leavitt, io7 Mass. 453 (187). By statute, California admits an affidavit which contains evidence of a verdict arrived at by chance. Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 657; Donner v. PalmerBradley, 23 Cal. 40 (863) ; but this has not been extended to a quotient verdict, Turner & Platt v. Tuolumne County Water Co., 25 Cal. 397 (1864); nor
to a misunderstanding as to the effect of the verdict, Polhemus v. Herman &
George, 50 Cal. 438 (1875). Similar statutes have been passed in Arkansas
(Dig. Stat. 1874, Sec. 1971) and Texas (Revised Stat., Art. 817, Sees. 7-8).
Tennessee admits an affidavit as to a quotient verdict, Joyce v. State, 7 Baxter
273 (1874) ; and also as to the fact that a juryman acquiesced because he was
led to believe that a pardon would be granted the accused if convicted. Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. 6o (Tenn. 182T). An affidavit was also admitted to
prove that a juryman testified to his fellows after the jury was impanelled.
Lee v. State, 121 Tenn. 521 (1oS). In Iowa an affidavit will be received as
to a matter not essentially a part of the verdict-as for example, the finding of
a quotient verdict; Manix v Malony, 7 Iowa 81 (z8.8); Wright v. Illinois &
Mississippi Telegraph Co., 2o Iowa 195 (i866), and the misconduct of jurors.
Griffin & Adams v..Harriman, 74 Ia. 436 (1888). Affidavits have been received to show that the amount of damages announced should carry interest.
Burlingame v. Central R. of Minn., 23 Fed. 706 (C. C. A. 1885) ; Elliott v.
Gilmore et al., r4s Fed. 964 (C. C. A. i9o6). England and several American
states allow an affidavit to show what the actual verdict agreed upon was
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and that a mistake was made in returning it. Roberts v. Hughes, 7 M. & W.
399 (184): Layman v. Graybill, 14 Ind. 166 (:86o); Dalrymple v. Williams,
63 N. Y. 3 61 (1875).
Many courts have held that an affidavit of a juror is not admissible to
impeach a verdict by showing misconduct of himself or a fellow-juryman outside the jury room. Williams v. Montgomery, 6o N. Y. 648 (1875); Pickens
v. Boom Co., 58 V. Va. iz (igos); Wyckoff, Jr, v. Chicago City Ry. Co.,
234 Ill. 6T3, 85 N. E. 237 (igoS). But in other cases such affidavits have been
admitted on the ground that the rule denying their competency applies only
where the affidavits relate to conduct in the jury room and not to the conduct
of a juror or third person outside the jury room. Studley v. Hall, 22 Me. 198
(842) ; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kans. 539 (1874) ; United States v. Ogden, ios Fed.
371 (D. C. igoo).
It is submitted that the principal case is correctly decided. The affidavit
related to an occurrence which took place outside the jury room and to a mistake made in announcing the verdict in open court. Each of these reasons
has been held sufficient to admit the affidavit of a juror.
WULs-CoxsucrioN--Gi'rs OvmR AFrm PARTIcuLAR EsTATz.-After
creating certain trusts of his property to provide for his wife and children
during their lives, the testator directed that "after these trusts have been
fully executed, then the said property shall descend and'go as my estate according to the then existing laws of Pennsylvania." Held: The estate will
be distributed to the testator's next of kin living at the period of distribution-:.
not those living at the time of his death." Leech's Estate, 274 Pa. 369
It is a universal rule that, under intestate laws, the estate of the decedent goes to his next of kin as of the time of his death. Kingsbury v.
Scoville, 26 Conn. 349 (1857) ; 18 C. J. 82:, 876. So, also, where the intestate
laws are used to direct the distribution of an estate after the termination of
one or more particular estates, the next of kin are, nevertheless, those who
were such at the testator's death rather than at the time o, eventual distribution, un!ess a contrary intent clearly appears. Bullock v. Downes, 9 H. L. C.
i (Eng. 86o)); Mortimer v. Slater, (1877) 7 Ch. D. 322, affirmed sub nona.
Mortimore v. Mortimore (1879) 4 App. Cas. 448; Stewart's Estate, 147 Pa.
383, 23 AtL s99 (1892) ; Jewett v. Jewett, 2oo Mass. 310, 86 N. E. 308 (1908);
Tatham's Estate, 25o Pa. 269, 95 At. 52o (19,5); Himmel v, Himmel, 294 Ill.
557 (ig2o); Schouler, Wills, Sec. 563 (5th ed. 19i5); Jarman, Wills, :641
et seq. (6th ed. 19io).
In the following cases, language similar to that used in the principal case
was held not td show such a contrary intention. Cable v. Cable, :6 Beav. 5ol
(Eng. 1853) ("to persons who should then become entitled to take") ; Cusack
v. Rood 24 Weekly Rep. 391 (1876) ("between persons who, under the
intestate statutes, would then be entitled thereto") ; Childs v. Russell, 1x Mete.
16 (Mass. 1846) ("After her decease, among my heirs, according to law");
Mortimore v. Mertimore, supra ("to such persons as will then be entitled
to receive the same as my next of kin under the statute").
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On the other hand, in the following cases, a sufficient expression of a
contrary intention was held to change the time of determining the heirs or
next of kin from the date of the tegtator's death to the date pointed out by
him. Long v. Klackall, 3 Ves. 486 (Eng. 1797) ("for such persons as should
then be the legal representatives) ; In re Mellish (1916), I Ch.56z ("persons
who shall then be my next of kin") ; Hutchinson v. National Refuges (192o),
App. Cas. 794 ("for such person as, on the failure of such trusts, shall be my
next of kin"); Wood v. Schoen, 216 Pa. 42, 66 At. 79 (x9o7) ("then to
those who would then be entitled thereto under the intestate laws"). The
last-named case may readily be distinguished from the principal since the second "then," in that case, can have no other meaning than that which is
given it; whereas, in the principal case, the second "then" clearly is applied
to the interstate laws alone, for the purpose of rendering contingent the interest of the next of kin and hence secure from attachment for their debts.
A contrary intention is not established by the fact that one, or even all, of
the next of kin at the testators death are holders of particular estates or
necessarily dead at the time of the gift over. Stewart's Estate, supra;Rotch
v. Rotch, 173 Mass. 525, 53 N. E. 268 (i899); Tuttle v. Woolworth, 6z N. J.
Eq. 532, 5o Atl. 445 (iroi). Confra (scrnble), Beers v. Grant, Iio N. Y. 52,
97 N. Y. S. 117 (App. Div. i9os).
It would appear that the court, in the principal case, although not discussing Stewart's Estate, supra, and similar decisions in its opinion, has limited
the rule there laid down by construing as expressive of a contrary intent words
which other courts, in other jurisdictions, have not deemed sufficient for that
purpose.
VILLs-DvjsE -0 WIr-EFFECr oF DIVoacE.-The plaintiff obtained a
divorce subsequent to the making of a will in her favor by her husband. A
property settlement was made, giving the husband an absolute release from
all legal obligations owed the plaintiff. Eighteen months later the husband
died. No change had been made in the will. The plaintiff proceeded for probate. The defendants, heirs of the husband, contended that the divorce revoked the will by implication of law. Held: The plaintiff was entitled to
probate. In re Bartlett's Estate, 189 N. Wg. 39o (Neb 192).
At common law certain changes in the condition and circumstances of
the testator worked a revocation of his will by implication of law. This
rule had its origin in the ecclesiastical courts of England. 4 Kent, Commentaries 52! ;Brady v. Cubitt, I Doug. 31 (Eng. 1778). Unless abrogated by
statute this is the settled law in all the states in this country. 3o Amer. & Eng.
Encyc. of Law 6j.3. Authorities are not agreed as to the character of "the
change in the condition and circumstances of the testator" essential to give
rise to the legal presumption of revocation. Some courts have restricted the
rule to marriage and birth of issue in the case of a man, and mere marriage
in the case of a woman. Wogan v. Small, ii S. & R. 141 (Pa. 1824); In re
Jones' Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 6o At. 915 (Pa. 19o5) ; Page, Wills, 318 (190).
It seems to be well established that a divorce alone does not revoke a
previously executed will. Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298 (1875) ; Card v.
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Alexander, 4 Conn. 492 (1881); In re Jones' Estate, supra. A property settlement especially decreed to be in lieu of all the wife's rights and privileges
in her husband's property, however, is an additional factor which tends to
strengthen the establishment of implied revocation. The views on this point
are in conflict. Some courts hold that by the divorce and settlement the parties
become as strangers to each other-a change in their relations sufficient to
justify an implied revocation of the will. i Underhill, Wills, 36o (xgoo); Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. x6, 54 N. V. 699 (1893); In re Hall's Estate, io6
Minn. 5o2, 1i9 N. W. 219 (19o). Elsewhere it has been held as in the principal case, that while the wife is legally divested of her rights and privileges
in the estate of her husband by the divorce and settlement, nevertheless this
alone does not prevent her taking under his voluntary will which he had ample
time to revoke had he so intended. Baacke v. Baacke, so Neb. i, 69 N- W.
3q3 (x896); In re Jones' Estate, supra; In re Brown's Estate, 139 Iowa 219,
ri, N. W. 26o (i9oS). While the precedents on this particular point are few
and conflicting, the law as laid down in the principal case seems to be.favored
by a slight majority of jurisdictions.

